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In February of 1663 Spinoza’s student Simon de Vries wrote to him asking whether a definition must be clearly known and true.​[1]​  De Vries had consulted the mathematician Borelli, who contrasted his own opinion with that of the mathematician Clavius.  Clavius held that a definition must merely be consistently applied, since definitions are arbitrary.  Borelli held that a definition must be clearly known and true so that conclusions drawn from it could be clearly known and true. In his reply Spinoza rejects both views.​[2]​  Spinoza distinguishes between two kinds of definitions, those that explicate a thing “as it exists outside of the intellect” and those that explicate a thing “as it is conceived by us, or can be conceived”.​[3]​  According to Spinoza, the former sort of definition needs to be true and “serves to explicate a thing whose essence alone is in question”. But the latter sort of definition need not be true.  By way of example, Spinoza contrasts defining Solomon’s temple with defining a proposed temple design.  Amazingly, Spinoza never mentions whether his own definitions are like the former or like the latter.
As de Vries noticed, understanding Spinoza’s definitions is crucial to understanding the Ethics.  In Spinoza scholarship, some have even held that we are faced with a dilemma: either Spinoza’s propositions are true, in which case his definitions must be true in spite of indications to the contrary, or Spinoza stipulated his definitions and the propositions are sophistical.  If one is under the influence of this dilemma, then Spinoza’s writing will seem hopeless since the most unusual definitions begin as if he is reporting common usage (“That thing is said to be free which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature…”), and the least unusual begin as if he is acknowledging a departure from the lexical definition (“By God I mean an absolutely infinite being”). Yet it is my contention that this dilemma is a false one, and the solution to our hopelessness is to reject it altogether. As we do so, we will sort out why the dilemma seemed compelling to some authors in the first place. Spinoza’s thinking on definitions is often hard to explain, let alone defend, but most of the problems that have been recognized in the literature can be explained away once we recognize that Spinoza used two different types of definition in his Ethics, which I will refer to as a priori and a posteriori. My solution is a large departure from previous work on Spinoza’s definitions; most Spinoza commentators have written as though all of Spinoza’s definitions must be of one type.​[4]​ To some extent, this misunderstanding of Spinoza’s definitions must be blamed on a misunderstanding of the distinction between nominal and real definitions, a distinction that they assume Spinoza refers to in the letters to de Vries. I think careful attention to Spinoza’s writing on definition will show that Spinoza himself never acknowledged that such a distinction exists.
The nominal/real distinction, as it has been acknowledged in the Spinoza literature is often confused. An example of this confusion is Nadler’s claim that there are only two ways to think about definitions, either as descriptions of some real thing or as stipulations without truth value.​[5]​  Variations of this claim are prevalent in Spinoza literature, though it is demonstrably false.  If I define ‘unicorn’, I do not say anything arbitrary.  In fact I go to great lengths to specify what others mean by this word.  And if I define it as an animal without a horn, my definition is false, but neither do I describe a real thing (obviously).  Sorting out confusions like these should dissolve the dilemma about the validity of Spinoza’s inferences, though it will by no means render Spinoza’s thought free of difficulties.  
Once Spinoza’s definitions are properly categorized a clear bifurcation of the Ethics comes into view. On one side will lie propositions that have been derived using a priori definitions, which Spinoza considers to be absolutely certain, and on the other side, propositions that have been derived using a posteriori definitions, about which Spinoza does not feel certain since they alone depend on assumed postulates in addition to axioms.  In order to establish this bifurcation, I will first need to discuss how the distinction between nominal and real definitions has been understood in the Spinoza literature.  I will then lay out my theory of how Spinoza categorized his definitions in the Ethics drawing largely on his correspondence and the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect.  In the final two sections of my paper, I will explain how this new categorization of Spinoza’s definitions alters our reading of the Ethics, and offers us new purchase into the role of geometric proof in Spinoza’s philosophy.

Against the Nominal/Real Distinction in Spinoza’s Ethics
When we speak of definitions, we often act as though there are only two categories of definitions—real and nominal.  The real/nominal distinction is sometimes thought to have originated with Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, but in fact it is more accurate to say that our idea of the distinction comes from Locke.  Locke distinguished between a real and a nominal essence.  According to Locke, a thing’s real essence is its physical constitution, its atomic structure, while a thing’s nominal essence is the general idea that we have of that thing.  And so he holds that a nominal definition gives our idea of the thing defined while a real definition gives its true essence.  It is quite unclear what giving the real essence of a thing would amount to, for this reason and others Locke’s view was immediately criticized by Mill.  Still traces of Locke’s view remain today.  Though they share a Lockean heritage, there is a great deal of variety in what is meant by the terms ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ among those authors who make a distinction between real and nominal definition.  This variance is largely unremarked on, often even unnoticed, with the usual exception being those who explicitly reject Locke’s notion of the distinction.  I cannot engage in a full discussion of these debates here.  What is important for my purpose in this paper is that there are at least three different versions of the real/nominal distinction operating in the Spinoza literature.  Not one of these accurately describe Spinoza’s project, though some are better than others.  
The most significant version of the nominal/real distinction in the literature on Spinoza is taken from that given by his contemporaries Arnauld and Nicole in their famous Port-Royal Logic.  In the Port-Royal, Arnauld and Nicole warn against the faulty logic that results from the equivocation of various meanings of the same term.​[6]​  To remedy this problem, they recommend keeping a clear distinction in mind between what they call definitions of names (definitio nominis) and definitions of things (definitio rei).  Definitions of names warn us as to how a term will be used, that is, they tell us what the term will be used to name.  Definitions of things, on the other hand, tell us something about the idea signified by the term.  (Arnauld and Nicole take it that words signify ideas.) Definitions of things need reasons or arguments in their support since they make assertions about relations between ideas.  Definitions of names cannot be disputed since they have been merely stipulated, but nothing much can be inferred from them either.  Arnauld and Nicole use heaviness as an example, asserting that we can accept “an inward principle that makes a stone fall without being impelled by anything” as a definition of the name ‘heaviness’ as used by a certain author, but we cannot accept it as a definition of the thing itself since what we experience as heaviness is not actually caused by an inward principle of stones.​[7]​
Spinoza must have read the Port-Royal Logic.  He had a copy in his library and most likely was familiar with Arnauld’s criticisms of Descartes’ Meditations.  Arnauld and Nicole had a great influence on Locke, and so it is tempting to see a connection between the Lockean real/nominal distinction and the distinction that Spinoza refers to in his letters.  Yet since the Port-Royal was published in 1662 Spinoza couldn’t have read (the published version) before he wrote the first draft of the Ethics, not to mention before be worked out his own theory of definition in the TIE.  Nor does he ever mention the Port-Royal view, approvingly or disapprovingly, in all his subsequent writing about definitions in his letters.​[8]​  In light of this fact it is surely a mistake to equate Spinoza’s view of definitions with Arnauld and Nicole’s view without further investigation.  And still some commentators have implicitly done this, undoubtedly motivated by the assumption that there is only one distinction between definitions to make, and anyone discussing definition must be making that distinction.  
But this is not the case, and in this section I aim to show that Spinoza scholars have not been discussing the nominal/real distinction, but rather three different distinctions they all call by that name.  In the next section I will show that none of the three distinctions I identify in the Spinoza literature is the distinction that Spinoza himself was after.  This will allow me to show that the dispute between those who think that Spinoza’s definitions are “nominal” and those that think his definitions are “real” is based on a false dilemma aided by the inconsistent use of those terms.
Besides Arnauld and Nicole’s names/things distinction, a second distinct way to categorize definitions is given by Gueroult.  In the Port-Royal Logic both types of definition tell us something about ideas. A definition either marks out a new idea by baptizing it, or it fills out and clarifies an old idea.  In either case, the definition gives the meaning of some word.  Gueroult, on the other hand, explains the difference between nominal definitions and real definitions as a difference between defining words and defining things, which is a way of speaking that invites confusion.  In fact, Guerolt’s method of categorizing definitions is even more problematic than Arnauld and Nicole’s. To see why, we can look to what Gueroult says about Spinoza’s definitions:

On the one hand, they express that which we understand by such a word: in this sense they are nominal definitions; on the other hand, they describe that which the things are in themselves; in this sense, they are the definitions of things or true definitions.  They are thus at once Definitions of words and Definitions of things…it is evident that a complete definition must be both at the same time.​[9]​


Curley objects that no sense can be made of Gueroult on this point when he states, “I do not see how any definition could be held, at one and the same time, to two incompatible sets of requirements”.​[10]​  But of course Gueroult is right; his requirements are not incompatible, since it is perfectly possible for some lexical definition to also give a true description of the world (e.g. ‘a pickle is a cucumber preserved in brine’).  But if so, it cannot then be the case that definitions of things are true while definitions of words are not, and Gueroult would be confused if he were asserting that complete definitions both are and are not required to be true.  The difference between a definition of a word and a definition of a thing could not be one of truth value, and for this reason it should not be equated with Arnauld and Nicole’s distinction between definitions of names and definitions of things, since the main difference between these is supposed to be their truth value.  
Gueroult seems to be asserting that complete definitions must both describe something accurately and give the meaning associated with the word defined.  But what thing are they describing accurately?  It is not right to say that they describe the thing denoted by the word defined, since many of the words that we want to define denote quite a large set of things.  Here again, ‘pickle’ is a good example.  ‘A pickle is a cucumber preserved in brine’ does say something true about the world, but it does not give a description of any particular thing.  Rather, it tells us the qualities that dictate whether particular things may be called pickles or not.  If it gives an accurate description of any particular pickle it does so only because it accurately described the features of that pickle which led us to call it one.  Alternatively, describing pickles in general, or describing the kind of thing that pickles are would be to attribute qualities to that kind, an activity that may not be possible if kinds are abstract.  But even if it is possible, it doesn’t seem that ‘a cucumber preserved in brine’ describes a kind of a thing, unless what is meant by describing a kind is simply explaining which things are members of a that kind, which again is just to give the features of pickles which merit their name.  It is unclear how this differs from giving the meaning of a word, and so Gueroult’s praise for definitions which do both is at least obscure.
The supposed tension between defining a word and defining a thing, the tension that Gueroult is attempting to release, is a tension between sense and reference, a tension that arises when we lack some kind of knowledge about the referent of a word, as when we are not aware that Hesperus is Phosphorus.  To make sense of Curley’s worry we must understand it as a worry about Spinoza’s purpose in writing the definitions.  Spinoza’s definitions tell us what is under investigation.  If we set out to investigate the morning star, the worry is that we may never find out much about it.  Whereas if we set out to investigate that star, the one we call Hesperus, then we might discover that both stars are Venus. 
	Drawing a distinction between definitions of words and definitions of things only serves to further our confusion, and yet the distinction is still in use, and usually conflated with the nominal/real distinction.  Aaron Garrett writes (somewhat) in response to Gueroult’s work that Spinoza’s definitions “begin as nominal understandings of indeterminate extensions and gradually pick out more limited extensions and concrete adequate ideas as the method proceeds”.​[11]​  This is an attempt to reconcile Gueroult with Curley that does not work.  Curley holds that a merely “nominal” definition could not establish the existence of the thing defined.​[12]​  This indicates that Curley considers the real/nominal distinction to be the distinction between intensional and extensional definition.  Curley’s worry is that Spinoza may be purporting to investigate the referent, or the extension, of a word, when he is in fact only investigating the sense, or the intension, of that word.  Garrett’s claim that the definitions begin as “nominal” and end up “real” cannot solve this worry since intensional definitions cannot become extensional definitions.  More to the point, extensional definitions cannot be “given” at all, not in the way that one can give an intensional definition.  There might be something we can do that would count as specifying the extension of a term, but this is rarely accomplished, because if we plan to do it in writing, then the extension should be finite, and every thing in the extension must be easily referred to with some other word besides the one that is being defined.  If Curley doubts the legitimacy of reasoning from intensional definitions, then he doubts the legitimacy of reasoning from any definition, and is in effect asking for an empirical investigation instead.
	Yet Spinoza cannot empirically investigate God, for instance, since he is setting out to prove the existence of God.  He says to de Vries that when we agree on a thing’s existence, like Solomon’s temple, we give one type of definition, but otherwise we give another type of definition.  So Spinoza could not have in mind the distinction between definitions suggested by Curly—the difference between intensional and extensional definition.  In fact, both of Spinoza’s types of definition are intensional.  We could not give an extensional definition of any word that fails to refer to anything, and for the vast majority of words we can’t really “give” an extensional definition at all.  Because of this, I think it is clear that when Spinoza distinguishes between two types of definition he does not have in mind the distinction that we know as intensional/extensional.  
	In sum, classifying definitions is a much more complicated matter than commentators on Spinoza have previously acknowledged.  There are at least four ways to categorize definitions: the three ways I have discussed in this section (names/things, words/things, and intensional/extensional) as well as Spinoza’s a priori/a posteriori classification.  These categories are not all mutually exclusive, for example a definition of a name as understood by Arnauld and Nicole would most certainly always be a definition of a word and also an intensional definition.  Further, even though the “real/nominal” distinction usually purports to be both exhaustive and exclusive, we have seen that this is not always obvious.  No matter how we understand the distinction, it is quite hard to make the case that some particular definition is not both a definition of a name and a definition of a thing, say.  (It is also not clear that Spinoza’s two categories are mutually exclusive, though he speaks as though they are, as we will see in the next section.)  I don’t doubt that there is a more promising way to categorize definitions that is not discussed in this paper.  But if Spinoza’s understanding of definition is even to be in the running, then it must first be established that those who have previously debated his definitions have gotten him wrong, which is what I attempted to show in this section.  In the following section I will take a closer look at Spinoza’s own writing about definition.

Spinoza’s Definitions
For Spinoza, a definition is an explication and also a description of a thing.  Spinoza never gives an example of a single thing being defined both ways; he says we use one kind of definition for Solomon’s temple and another for our planned temple.  The import of this distinction is not entirely clear, but it need not mean that Spinoza believed that we could never give different definitions (or different kinds of definitions) for the same thing.  But it does imply that it is something about the things defined that dictates our categorization of definitions.  I propose that the way to understand this tendency in Spinoza is as an indication of what type of philosophical investigation he thought each thing merited.  He thought we give one kind of definition for Solomon’s temple because our investigation into such a temple should make reference to the very thing that others refer to by that name.  Since the thing exists “outside our intellect” it requires an a posteriori definition, i.e. our definition must be justified using a posteriori methods.  Spinoza thought we give another kind of definition for the planned temple because in order to investigate such a temple we don’t need to know if the temple exists or not, we must begin our investigation with a definition justified on a priori grounds.
	Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect provides the strongest evidence that Spinoza allowed for two types of definition in order to define two types of things.  In setting out the requirements of a good definition, he says that if a definition is of a created thing, its definition should include its proximate cause.  If it is of something uncreated it must (among other things) leave “no room for the question: Does it exist?”​[13]​  Since Spinoza very obviously saw definition as essential to ontological investigation, I propose that it is helpful to view his types of definition as marking an epistemological difference rather than a logical difference. 
	If it is still tempting to see Spinoza and the Port-Royal authors as making the same point about definitions, since both are categorizing definitions according to their truth value, it is instructive to consider their disparate purposes in giving a theory of definition.  Arnauld and Nicole want to prevent disputes about words masquerading as more substantive disputes as well as a kind of sophistic philosophy that trades on the obscurity of its terms.  Spinoza, of course, would decry these things as well, but he is primarily advising those who might read his work (or undertake similar work), rather than correcting the mistakes of other philosophers.  And so he writes from the perspective of the philosopher using the geometric method justifying his definitions as the best ones.  
He takes this perspective in the TIE, and in his exchange with the mathematician Tschirnhaus when he explains how important it is to philosophize using the best definitions.  In the TIE he gives two definitions for a circle.  The first is “a figure in which the lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal”, and the second is “a figure described by any line of which one end is fixed and the other moveable”.​[14]​  The former is supposedly a bad definition, because it gives only one of the properties of a circle, whereas the latter gives the essence of a circle.  Arnauld and Nicole also think that some definitions are better than others; for example, they advise defining words according to common meanings rather than appropriating common words for new uses.  But they would not have seen a distinction between the two definitions for a circle that Spinoza gives; they would call both definitio res.
Arnauld and Nicole think that definitions are used to clarify meaning.  They are concerned only with reference when evaluating and categorizing definitions.  But Spinoza evaluates definitions according to what can be known from them, and he seems to find it difficult to articulate why.  We can see this difficulty in his exchange with Tschirnhaus.  Tschirnhaus notices that the reference of a circle could be fixed in a number of ways; he poses this as a challenge to Spinoza’s claim that there is only one definition that can give an adequate idea of a circle:

One could go on and say that the adequate idea of a circle can be expressed in an infinite number of ways, each of which explicates the adequate nature of a circle.  And although from each of these everything else knowable about a circle can be deduced, this comes about more easily from one idea than from another. ​[15]​

Spinoza’s reply avoids the issue and reiterates his position:

[I]n order that I may know which out of many ideas of a thing will enable all the properties of the object to be deduced, I follow this one rule, that the idea or definition should express its efficient cause. ​[16]​

Spinoza seems to miss the point of the question.  If the virtue of a definition is its ability to give us an “adequate idea” of the thing defined then it seems for a great number of things there should be multiple definitions that could do this equally well.  But Spinoza insists that a definition must give the efficient cause of a thing in order to allow all the properties of the thing to be deduced.  
Spinoza never gives us a good reason for this insistence.  But we should note that his view of the role that definitions serve in proofs, including his insistence that a definition must tell us a thing’s cause, is an extension of Aristotle’s view that proofs can give us knowledge of an object only by giving us knowledge of its cause, and that giving a thing’s cause is giving a definition of that thing.​[17]​  For Aristotle, knowing the cause would be the only way to know why something is the way it is and not some other way, the only way to know the thing’s essence.  On this view, to know a thing’s cause, to know its essence, and to know its definition are all to know the same thing.  Spinoza inherits this Aristotelian view from Descartes and is unprepared to explicitly defend it against the challenge posed by Tschirnhaus.  Perhaps Spinoza himself did not recognize the vast differences between Tschirnhaus’s view and his own.  A subsequent letter to Tschirnhaus shows that Spinoza allowed that he may be wrong that all the properties of a circle could be derived from his definition; but he never gave up his claim that a definition should include a thing’s cause.​[18]​
Spinoza’s refusal is puzzling, but it should at least establish that when Spinoza says there are two types of definition he could not be referring to the distinction to which the Port-Royal authors refer.  Any definition for Spinoza must give us causal information and there is no such requirement put forward by Arnauld and Nicole.  It is also worthwhile to note that if definitions serve only to tell us what is being referred to, so that we don’t confuse different possible meanings (as Arnauld and Nicole believe), then we don’t need to know the definition of a thing in order to know something about it.  If we could be assured that our audience knew what we were talking about (perhaps using some kind of ostention) then we would not need to begin philosophical investigation by giving definitions.  Spinoza, on the other hand, insists that our philosophical method begin with definitions, not to minimize the confusion of others, but so that we ourselves are not confused.​[19]​  And so if we mean to gain clear and distinct ideas of things Spinoza advises that “…if the thing is in itself, or, as is commonly said, self-caused, then it will have to be understood solely through its essence…” and “…if the thing is not in itself and needs a cause for its existence, then it must be understood through its proximate cause”.​[20]​  I call the former an a priori definition because it requires only a priori justification and I call the latter an a posteriori definition because it requires an a posteriori justification.
As for the disagreement about the definition(s) of a circle, we may want to side with Tschirnhaus.  But it would be a mistake to throw the baby out with the bathwater.  Spinoza is not wrong that definitions can lead to knowledge, and commentators who consider this view so ridiculous that they hesitate even to ascribe it to Spinoza​[21]​ should remember Quine’s two dogmas.  Spinoza’s may not be the best or most useful way to classify definitions, but it is one distinct way among others that definitions may be classified.  Spinoza believes it is the best way, because he believes that definitions lead to knowledge, though in two different ways.

The Role of Definition in the Ethics
Which leaves us (somewhat) back where we began – are the definitions in the Ethics a priori or a posteriori? In his reply to de Vries, Spinoza seems to assert that his definitions are a priori.  He says, 

Here is another example…If I say that each substance has only one attribute, this is mere assertion unsupported by proof.  But if I say that by substance I mean that which consists of only one attribute, this is a sound definition, provided that entities consisting of more than one attribute are thereafter given a name other than substance.​[22]​

Here he seems to assert that only consistency, not truth, is necessary for his definition of substance.  Of course this definition is not the definition of substance he gives in the Ethics. Rather, Spinoza is referring to de Vries’ questions about whether Spinoza is warranted in holding that substance may have more than one attribute.  But if we take this to mean that substance could have been defined that way then the definition of substance is an a priori definition.
As I have noted, commentary on this subject has been led astray by the arbitrary assumption that all the definitions in the Ethics must be of the same type.  Yet further confusion about what the types of definition are has led to what I believe are false dichotomies, in which we are forced to say that Spinoza’s definitions must be of x type because they simply could not be of y type.  For example, Curley says that Spinoza wants to deduce whether or not certain things exist, and a merely nominal definition could not do this.​[23]​  Bennett holds that the definitions must be real or lexical, because if they were not, Spinoza would not be able to use them in proofs alongside the same word used in its ordinary, non-stipulated sense.​[24]​  And yet the definitions do not seem to him to be in line with ordinary usage (for the most part), and so Bennett must rule out the possibility that they are lexical.  In response to this difficulty, Bennett and Curley hold that the method of the Ethics is hypothetico-deductive.​[25]​  So the definitions are first put forward as hypotheses, and then confirmed to be real if they match up with the data, i.e. our experience of the world.  
These commentators (and others​[26]​) seem to be in agreement with Berkeley and Hegel that Spinoza’s propositions could not be true unless his definitions are true.  In other words, they agree with Arnauld and Nicole that “nominal” definitions cannot prove anything.  Since I hold that Spinoza understands definitions to be either a priori or a posteriori we should ask whether either of these would render Spinoza’s propositions illegitimate.  I hope to show that neither type of definition would undermine Spinoza’s propositions, and thus the legitimacy of the propositions does not force us to classify the definitions as either a priori or a posteriori.  In fact, careful attention to the way Spinoza uses his definitions leads me to believe that the Ethics contains both types of definition.
First, I will confront a passage in which Spinoza seems to say that all definitions must be true.  In the TIE he writes,

Therefore, as long as we are engaged in an enquiry into real things, it will never be permissible for us to draw a conclusion from what is abstract, and we shall take great care not to mix the things that are merely in the intellect with those things that are in reality.  The most secure conclusion is to be drawn from some particular affirmative essence, i.e., from a true and legitimate definition.​[27]​

Since Spinoza holds that a priori definitions need not be true, this passage might seem to force us to classify all of the definitions as a posteriori.  Though it seems to suggest a contrast between worthless a priori knowledge and concrete a posteriori knowledge, this reading is too hasty.  For Spinoza, ‘real’ and ‘physical’ are not synonymous.  His references to physical and real beings elsewhere in the TIE are meant to distinguish the two. For instance, he writes, “But it should be noted that by the series of causes and real beings I do not here mean the series of mutable particular things, but only the series of fixed and eternal things.”​[28]​  So “real things” in this passage is obviously not meant to refer to things known through experience, as commentators like Curley have suggested.  
	I think the best reading of this passage is not as an attack on a priori definitions, but merely a caution against using them to define those things we know a posteriori.  Furthermore, though Spinoza clearly points out that a priori definitions cannot be dismissed on the basis that they fail to match a posteriori knowledge, he would hardly condone the use of any and all possible a priori definitions.  His letter to Oldenburg makes this clear, when he defends his definition of God over others.​[29]​  God, being not a thing that we know empirically, must have an a priori definition for Spinoza.  But just because a priori definitions cannot be rejected for being false, does not mean they can never be rejected.  Nor does it mean that some of them cannot be true, as Spinoza says about his definition of substance.
	It is not a contradiction for Spinoza to hold that many of his definitions are not required to be true, in the sense of matching up with another’s idea of the thing defined, while simultaneously holding that his definitions are true.  It’s possible that many people have no idea at all about God, or freedom, so Spinoza could not be required to give a definition acceptable to them.  Others have confused ideas about these things, ideas which contradict each other, so Spinoza could not be required to give a definition matching up with theirs.  But of course he is not interested in giving a definition of God so foreign to his readers that they would not see the point.  If his definitions were stipulated, in the sense derided by Curley, et. al, then he could have just said ‘by God I mean substance’ and been done with it.  He does not, because Spinoza knows as well as we do that this is a horrible definition (at least for users of the English that we are familiar with).  ‘God means substance’ is simply a bad definition, while ‘God means an absolutely infinite being’ gives the sense of the term in a way that would be acceptable to many, while providing a starting point for further understanding.  ‘God means substance’, as a definition, can tell us nothing, legitimately, about God (unless our language were to change significantly).  But ‘God means an absolutely infinite being’ can tell us something—for instance, that God is substance—by virtue of being the lexical definition of God.​[30]​  When Spinoza proves that God exists, he is using the definition of God to do this.  The fact that his definition is one claim among many about the meaning of ‘God’ does not make his proofs illegitimate.​[31]​  It does not mean that he is merely stipulating that God exists.  His proofs of God’s existence may fail for other reasons, or his definition may fail to capture what we mean by ‘God”, but he does not fail to prove something just because the term he uses is given a meaning by him which is in some ways arbitrary.
	This point about definition was accepted by commentators like Wolfson and Hampshire, but is more rarely accepted today.  Yet Wolfson and Hampshire erred in the opposite direction, by supposing that all of Spinoza’s definitions were a sort of claim about the meaning of words which Spinoza might use to prove the existence of the definiendum.  Instead, Spinoza includes definitions in the Ethics that can only be justified by experience alongside definitions that can have no such justification.
	First, it should be obvious to us that the definitions of Ethics I are a priori.  This does not mean that they come from nowhere; they are meant to be definitions that others would accept (otherwise Spinoza would not feel the need to defend them in his letters).  But they are not entirely subject to public opinion polls, since Spinoza does mean to change public opinion as much as possible.  The only reason to suppose that Spinoza’s definitions in part I are in any way empirical is either a mistaken idea about what types of definition there are, or a mistaken idea about the limits of a priori definitions. 
	Second, while the claims of part I of the Ethics must be known a priori, the subsequent parts of Ethics contain many claims about the human body, the human mind, and human emotions.  And many things we know about our bodies, minds, and emotions are known a posteriori; because of this, these parts of Ethics contain a posteriori definitions.  In Spinoza’s terms, these definitions describe a thing as it exists, and thus must match up with that thing, as a description of Solomon’s temple must be true to that temple as we know it.  For Spinoza, a posteriori definitions are reserved for created things; they cannot prove the existence of the thing defined because they are descriptions of a thing whose existence is not in question.  Part II begins with a posteriori definitions of body, duration, and individual things, part III gives a posteriori definitions of the emotions, and part IV gives an a posteriori definition of conflicting emotions.  These are all things we experience; thus, in defining them, Spinoza must accord with our experience.  But this does not prevent him from going on to show consequences that surprise us, just as knowing an a posteriori definition of Clark Kent and another of Superman would not guarantee that I know that they are the same person. 
	Spinoza himself, in another letter to de Vries, says that we need experience to determine the existence of modes, which are created things, but that we do not need experience to determine the existence of attributes, and presumably, of substance either, since it is uncreated.​[32]​  He also writes,

We do not need experience [to know whether the definition is true] in the case of those things whose existence is not distinguished from their essence and is therefore deduced from their definition.

This letter is then clearly at odds with the hypothetico-deductive view, in so far as it is meant to apply to the Ethics as a whole.  A priori definitions—and most of the definitions in the Ethics seem to be a priori—do not need to be justified by experience.  A posteriori definitions, on the other hand, do need to be justified by experience.

The Role of Axioms, Postulates, and Definitions in the Mos Geometrico
	Another likely motivation for previous assumptions that Spinoza’s definitions must all be of one type is a desire to understand the Ethics as either a paradigm of rationalism or a beacon of empiricism.  Though there may be advantages to reading Spinoza as either arch-rationalist or arch-empiricist, Spinoza resists both readings.  Besides Spinoza’s division of definitions into two categories, there is another indication that his Ethics is neither wholly empirical, nor wholly rationalist, an indication that has gone virtually unnoticed in the literature.  This is Spinoza’s use of postulates alongside axioms.  
	Of those who mention Spinoza’s postulates (they get surprisingly little mention) most believe that they are no different from his axioms.​[33]​  And there is some superficial evidence that Spinoza regarded postulates and axioms as somehow interchangeable.  For instance, the first postulate of Part III is referred to as a “postulate or axiom”, and when writing to de Vries, Spinoza discusses definitions, axioms, and propositions, but not postulates.  In his Preface to Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, Meyer seems not to distinguish between postulates and axioms.  But as Curley notes, we shouldn’t take Meyer’s word for it, since we have no reason to assume that Spinoza agreed with everything Meyer wrote in that preface. ​[34]​  I think that even if we assume that Spinoza was in complete agreement with Meyer, we can still see a difference between the postulates and the axioms.  Meyer does not call axioms and postulates self-evident, nor does he call them a priori.  Rather, he says of both the axioms and postulates that “no one who has simply understood the words aright can possibly refuse assent”.  The category of things to which anyone could agree is broad, and most likely broader than the category of things that we today regard as self-evident.  Although axioms and postulates may both be claims that everyone would agree with, it could still be said that they differ in another way.
	The most important difference between axioms and postulates has (to my knowledge) only been noticed by Curley, namely, that all the postulates are about the human body.​[35]​  Not mentioned by Curley is that none of the axioms are about the human body, with one exception being the fourth axiom of part II.  This axiom is surprisingly similar to the first postulate of part III.  IIA4 reads, “We feel a certain body to be affected in many ways”, while the “postulate or axiom” IIIPost.1 reads, “The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of activity is increased or diminished; and also in many other ways which neither increase nor diminish its power of activity”.  These are similar, but not interchangeable.  The postulate in Part III is said to rest on Postulate 1 and Lemmas 5 and 7 from Part II; so perhaps if something rests on a postulate, it must itself be a postulate.  But more importantly, IIA4 is known with more certainty than IIIPost.1 because it is not committed to the existence of the human body.  This is similar to Descartes’ assertion that he is thinking, and that he can know that he is thinking without first knowing anything else.  What Descartes is not able to ascertain without any other knowledge is that he has a body.
	Another difference between axioms and postulates in the Ethics is the certainty with which Spinoza puts them forward.  We can see this in the comparison between IIA4 and IIIPost.1.  Who could doubt the axiom that we feel a certain body to be affected in many ways?  The postulate, on the other hand, is much more speculative.  Further, Spinoza supports the notion that the postulates are less certain than the axioms when he refers to them twice as assumed or supposed.  In the proof of IIIP15 he introduces Postulate 1 of III with the preface “Let it be supposed…” and in the Scholium of IIP17 he says the following:

So we see how it comes about that we regard as present things which are not so, as often happens.  Now it is possible that there are other causes for this through which I can explicate the matter just as if I had demonstrated it through its true cause.  Yet I do not think that I am far from the truth, since all the postulates that I have assumed contain scarcely anything inconsistent with experience; and after demonstrating that the human body exists just as we sense it (Cor. Pr. 13, II), we may not doubt experience.

When discussing this proposition that was demonstrated using postulates his language is much more cautious than the language that he uses when discussing propositions demonstrated with definitions and axioms alone.
	In claiming that Spinoza’s axioms are more certain than his postulates, I do not mean to argue that we should regard the axioms as self-evident.  Curley objects that Axiom 2 following IIP13, which he translates, “Each body moves now more slowly, now more quickly”, is not even a priori.  Of some interest here is the fact that Shirley translates this same axiom, “Each single body can move at varying speeds”, a claim about what is possible rather than what is observed.  So it could be argued that the axiom is a priori, but we should still be hesitant to ascribe the self-evident label.  Spinoza’s notion of axiom clearly includes truths which need elaborate demonstrations before they are accepted.  He says in Scholium 2 to IP8 

. . .if men were to attend to the nature of substance, they would not doubt at all the truth of Proposition 7; indeed, this Proposition would be an axiom to all and would be ranked among the universally accepted truisms.
	
Much more could be said about Spinoza’s axioms, what is important here is merely to contrast the axioms with the postulates, to support the idea that the Ethics is neither entirely a priori nor entirely a posteriori, and therefore includes both types of definition.  Spinoza treats his axioms as if they were truths that would be accepted at the time the axiom is put forward.  The postulates, on the other hand, are put forward provisionally, and insofar as they explain our experience they are adequate.  For example, take the Corollary to IIP17: “The mind is able to regard as present external bodies by which the human body has been once affected, even if they do not exist and are not present”.  This is said to rest on a postulate, IIPost5, that external bodies can determine liquid parts of the human body to leave a trace of themselves on soft parts of the human body.  Spinoza takes this postulate as a possible explanation of our experiences, and from it he deduces things which are consistent with our experience, the corollary that we sometimes think something is present when it is not.  This corollary is thereby a partial confirmation of that postulate.
	The mere fact that Spinoza called some of his claims postulates and some axioms is evidence that he regarded them differently.  What I mean to show here is that we can find some things to say about what this difference consisted in, though this matter deserves a fuller discussion and defense.  For now the point is that Spinoza’s postulates rely on experience, and are thus less certain and more subject to revision than his axioms.  Introduction of the postulates coincides roughly with introduction of a posteriori definitions: when only a priori definitions are given at the beginning of an investigation, then only axioms are offered at the start of his demonstrations.  Just as the axioms have a different epistemic status from the postulates in the Ethics, so too are the definitions bifurcated into two epistemically different types.  Recognition of this fact would prevent useless attempts to fit the entirety of the Ethics into a single box – we should not speak of the method of the Ethics, but rather the methods.  Of course the a priori method is much more heavily weighted than the a posteriori, but I hope that we understand each better if we allow them to coexist.
We should expect to end up with some loose ends here.  We are forced to reconstruct Spinoza’s thought from writings which were either not meant by the author to be published, or if intended for publication were by necessity carefully guarded.  One such end is Spinoza’s view of mathematical objects.  Spinoza insists that the definition of a circle must include its proximate cause (moving one end of a line).  Presumably this definition follows from his insistence that the definition of created things must include their manner of creation.  Yet Spinoza referred to circles as ‘mental constructs’, and this claim is puzzling because if mental constructs are created, they are certainly not drawn.
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